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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In the principal case the view that a gift and not a trust was intended is perhaps justified by the fact that if a trust were intended only
the income on the $1,000 would be available for the use specified, and
such income would be a negligible amount; whereas if a gift were intended, the full $1,000 would be available. However, the court discusses at length the validity of the bequest as a trust, and indicates that
it is void as such. In so doing in the light of the considerations mentioned in the foregoing discussion, the court unnecessarily confuses the
law of charitable trusts in North Carolina. The statute of 1925 and its
effects upon the earlier decisions relied on are not mentioned. The
opinion gives the impression that it is still legally impossible for the
trustee of an otherwise valid charitable trust in this state to be given
discretionary powers to select the particular objects and individuals to
be benefitted. And it betrays unawareness of the extent to which the
courts may, upon contests such as that in the principal case, or upon a
petition for instructions, or at the suit of the Attorney General, supervise the administration by the charitable trustee. 22
Wm. R. DAWES.

Criminal Law-Evidence--Admissibility of Evidence of a
Collateral Offense of Defendant to Prove the
Offense Charged.
D was indicted with state's witness for conspiracy to rob by means
of assault with firearms or other dangerous weapons, and for robbery
in pursuance of the conspiracy. As proof of the conspiracy the lower
court admitted in evidence testimony that a week after the alleged robbery state's witness and D conspired to burn, and did burn, an automobile to defraud an insurance company. This evidence was admitted
to show identity and guilty knowledge,' and the Supreme Court affirmed
2
the lower court ruling.
It is the general rule that a particular crime cannot be proved by
evidence of a distinct, substantive, unconnected collateral offense. 8 The
strict application of this rule is obviously desirable. Not only does evidence of other crimes committed by D tend to prejudice and mislead
the jury, but also D might be taken by surprise and be unprepared to
answer the accusation, if innocent, or, if guilty, be unable to mitigate its
effect upon the outcome of the trial for the offense charged in the
IN. C. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1935) §§4033, 4034; Tillinghast v. Council at
Narragansett Pier, 47 R. I. 406, 133 At. 662, 46 A. L. R. 827 (1927) (court set
up a trust until council incorporated).
I Record on Appeal, pp. 57, 351, State v. Flowers, 211 N. C 721, 192 S. E. 110
(1937).
State v. Flowers, 211 N. C 721, 192 S. E. 110 (1937).
People v. Molyneaux, 168 N, Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901), 62 L, R. A. 193
(1904).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
indictment.4 There are, however, certain well recognized exceptions
to this general rule. If a collateral offense of D will tend to show guilty
knowledge, intent, identity, malice or motive, plan or design, or if the
collateral offense is part of the res gestac of the crime charged, evidence
of the collateral crime is admissible. 5 In all cases, however,, there must
be a sufficient connection between the two crimes so that evidence of
the collateral crime will tend to establish D's guilt of the one charged.6
The North Carolina Court follows the general rule and its exceptions. 7
'State v. Beam, 184 N. C. 730, 115 S. E. 176 (1922).
See note 3, supra; 1 WIGMORF, EVmENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§300-306.
See cases cited infra note 7. Each of these cases supports this statement
either expressly or impliedly.
'A-Evidence of a collateral offense by D has been held inadmissible:
State v. Shuford, 69 N. C. 486 (1873) (where in a trial of D for murder of her newly born baby evidence of a similar previous offense was
offered) ; State v. Norton, 82 N. C. 629 (1880) (where in a trial of D
for assault and battery, supposedly with a pistol, evidence that two weeks
prior D had exhibited a pistol, and made threatening remarks about
prosecuting witness, was offered); State v. Jeffries, 117 N. C. 727, 23
S. E. 163 (1895) (where D was tried for pledging a bicycle already covered by a mortgage, and evidence was offered that he attempted to pledge
a wagon, five months later, also covered by the same mortgage) ; State
v. Frazier, 118 N. C. 1257, 24 S. E. 520 (1896) (where in a trial of D
for larceny of money he had given prosecutrix, evidence was introduced
that he had previously seduced prosecutrix, as it was not shown that
the money had been given to her because of the seduction); State v.
Graham, 121 N. C. 623, 28 S. E. 409 (1897) (where in a trial of D for
burning his lessor's house, after taking out insurance on the furniture
therein, evidence of a similar previous offense was offered); State v.
Beam, 184 N. C. 730, 115 S. E. 176 (1922) (where in a trial of D for
selling liquor evidence that D had sold liquor eleven years before was
offered) ; State v. Smith, 204 N. C. 638, 169 S. E. 23(Y (1933) (where in
a trial for breaking into a store and stealing therefrom evidence was offered that a store in another county, but belonging to the same people,
was broken into, and goods found in D's place seemed to be those taken
from the stores) ; State v. Jordan, 207 N. C. 460, 177 S. E. 333 (1934)
(where irk a trial of D for knowingly receiving stolen goods evidence was
offered that D sold liquor).
B-Evidence of a collateral offense has been held inadmissible because of
lack of connection between D and the collateral offense:
State v. Freeman, 49 N. C. 5 (1856) (where in a trial of a servant
for setting a house on fire evidence was offered of two previous fires
with which D was not shown to be connected) ; State v. Alston, 94 N. C.
930 (1886) (where in a trial of D for burning a barn evidence merely,
intimating that D was connected with another barn fire was offered) ;
State v. McCall, 131 N. C. 798, 42 S. E. 894 (1902) (where in a trial of
D for burning a church evidence was offered concerning the burning of a
mill by D's father just previously) ; State v. Fowler, 172 N. C. 905, 90
S. E. 408 (1916) (where on a charge of breaking into a building and
stealing therefrom evidence of other similar crimes in the same neighborhood was offered, but no connection was shown between D and the other
crimes) ; State v. Deadmon, 195 N. C. 705, 143 S. E, 514 (1928) (where
in a trial of D for burning a barn to collect insurance evidence was offered that another barn of D's had burned).
C-Evidence of a collateral offense by D has been held admissible as .part of
the res gtstae:
State v. Murphy, 84 N. C. 742 (1881) (where in a trial of D for
stealing prosecutor's pig evidence was offered that someone else found his
stolen pig in D's pen at the time prosecuting witness found his there) ;
State v. Mace, 118 N. C. 1244, 24 S. E. 798 (1896) (where in a trial of D
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for murder evidence was offered that D prevented witness from notifying
deceased's family by means of an assault with a gun) ; State v. Adams, 138
N. C. 688, 50 S. E. 765 (1905) (where D was tried for murder and
evidence was offered of serious injury inflicted on deceased's children at
the same time).
D-Evidence of a collateral offense -by D has been held admissible to show
intent:
State v. Parrish, 104 N. C. 679, 10 S. E. 457 (1889) (where D was
indicted for rape of his daughter and evidence of previous forcible intercourse was introduced); State v. Register, 133 N. C. 747, 46 S. E. 21
(1903) (where in a trial for murder committed in an alleged attempt to
rob evidence of the conspiracy to rob was offered) ; State v. Hight, 150
N. C. 817, 63 S. E. 1043 (1909) (where D was tried for embezzlement
of watches and evidence of similar offenses over a period of the preceding two years was offered) ; Stpttq v. Plyler, 153 N. C. 630, 69 S. E. 269
(1910) (where in a trial of. D for murder evidence that he had shortly
before shot at deceased was offered. The court held this was admissible
to show motive.); State v. Boynton, 155 N. C. 456, 71 S. E. 341 (1911)
(where in a trial of D for selling liquor evidence that he habitually kept
liquor on hand for purpose of sale was offered) ; State v. Leak, 156 N. C.
643, 72 S. E. 567 (1911) (where D was tried for assault with intent to
rape and evidence of another assault on prosecuting witness, on the same
day, was offered) ; Gray v. Cartwright, 174 N. C. 49, 93 S. E. 432 (1917)
(where in a trial of D for malicious prosecution of P for stealing a cow
evidence of other thefts of cattle by P was offered) ; State v. Simons,
178 N. C. 679, 100 S. E. 239 (1919) (discussed in body of comment);
State v. Stancill, 178 N. C. 683, 100 S. E. 241 (1919) (discussed in body
of comment); State v. Haywood, 182 N. C. 815, 108 S. E. 726 (1921)
(where on indictment for keeping liquor for purpose of sale evidence of
previous sales of liquor was offered) ; State v. Crouse, 182 N. C. 835,
108 S. E. 911 (1921) (where in a trial of D for possession of liquor for
purpose of sale evidence that a still, which had been worked the preceding night, was found ninety days prior on D's land was offered); State
v. Pannil, 182 N. C. 838, 109 S. E. 1 (1921) (where in a trial of D for
stealing oats, and receiving same, evidence that other stolen goods from
prosecutor's place were found in D's place was offered); State v. Dail,
191 N. C. 231, 131 S. E. 573 (1926) (where in a trial of D for stealing
an auto, and receiving same with felonious intent, evidence that the car
was used by D and his friends, who were staying at his home, in preconceived burglaries was offered); State v. Hardy, 209 N. C. 83, 182 S. E.
831 (1935) (where D was tried for receiving, possessing, and transporting liquor for the purpose of sale, and evidence that liquor was found in
a previous search of D's premises was offered) ; State v. Batts, 210 N. C.
659, 188 S. E. 99 (1936) (discussed in body of comment).
E-Evidence of a collateral offense by D has been held admissible to show
system or design:
State v. Wilkerson, 98 N. C. 696, 3 S. E. 683 (1897) (where D, a
county official, was tried for owrongfully obtaining money from the county
for a pauper, and evidence that D continued to get the money after the
pauper had moved out of the county andhad died was offered) ; State v.
Hight, 150 N. C. 817, 63 S. E. 1043 (1909) (facts given supra D) ; State
v. Winner, 153 N. C. 602,. 69 S. E. 9 (1910) (where in a trial of D for
selling liquor evidence of other sales in the same place in a similar manner
was offered); State v. Stancill, 178 N. C. 683, 100 S. E. 241 (1919)
(discussed in body of comment).
F-Evidence of a collateral offense'has been held admissible to show identity:
These cases are discussed in the body of the comment.
G--Evidence of a collateral offense has been held admissible to show guilty
knowledge:
State v. Twitty, 9 N. C. 248 (1822) (where in, trial of D for passing
counterfeit money evidence of previous possession of counterfeit bills on
many occasions was offered); State v. Murphy, 84 N. C. 742 (1881)
(facts given supra C) ; State v. Wilkerson, 98 N. C. 696, 3 S. E. 683
(1887) (facts given supra E) ; State v. Walton, 114 N. C. 783, 18 S. E.
945 (1894) (where in a trial of D for obtaining money under false pre-
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In the opinion in the principal case the general rule with its exceptions is set forth, and then the Court merely holds8 that the evidence
of the state "comes well within the exceptions to the general rule, as
recognized and applied in State v. Batts...,9 State v. Ray...,'0 State v.
Stancill..,11 State v. Simons....,12 The Court does not indicate under
which exception(s) the evidence is admitted, but a reference to the lower
court record shows that the evidence was admitted to show identity
and guilty knowledge in the conspiracy charge. 13 It is difficult to see
just how the question of guilty knowledge is involved, because if D
were shown to have conspired to rob it would be unnecessary to prove
that he knew of the wrongful nature of the act. Use of the term "guilty
knowledge" seems to have been a terminological slip on the part of
the Court, and in all probability the testimony was allowed only to show
the identity of the D as one of the conspirators.
However, the above-mentioned cases on which the Court relied for
its holding do not seem to support the Court's decision. In State v.
Batts' 4 D was tried for criminal conspiracy to wreck and damage his
automobile with intent to defraud an insurance company. Evidence
that a witness had seen D deliberately damage another of his automobiles and put in a claim therefor was held admissible on the question
of intent. In State v. Ray,' 5 wherein D was charged with knowingly receiving stolen cigarettes, evidence was admitted to show that shortly
before and after the transaction charged in the indictment D received
other stolen cigarettes. This evidence was held competent to show
tenses evidence of other similar offenses was offered); State v. Winner,
153 N. C. 602, 69 S. E. 9 (1910) (facts given supra E); State v. Boynton,
155 N. C. 456, 71 S. E. 341 (1911)

(facts given supra D) ; Greensboro

Life Ins. Co. v. Knight, 160 N. C. 592, 76 S.E. 623 (1912) (where in a

trial of D, an insurance agent, for fraudulent misrepresentation, evidence
that he had made the same representations to others was offered. Apparently there was no prior indictable offense, yet in admitting the evidence the court treated the problem as if there were.) ; State v. Mincher, 178 N. C. 698, 100 S.E., 339 (1919) (where in a trial of a prison
guard for receiving stolen goods from a "trusty" under his supervision evidence was offered that D allowed the "trusty" to overstay his leave,
that the "trusty" stole the goods, and that D subscribed to a newspaper
which carried the story and description of the stolen articles. Again
apparently there was no prior indictable offense, yet in admitting the
evidence the court treated the problem as if there were.); State v.
Dail, 191 N. C. 231, 131 S. -E. 573 (1926) (facts given supra D) ; State
v. Hildebran, 201 N. C. 780, 161 S.E. 488 (1931) (where in a trial of
D for conducting a bawdy house evidence that the inmates had previously
been lewd and boisterous in their actions was offered) ; State v. Ray, 209
N. C. 772, 184 S. E. 836 (1936) (discussed in body of comment).
'State v. Flowers, 211 N. C. 721, 724, 192 S. E. 110, 112 (1937).
p210 N. C. 659, 188 S. E. 99 (1936).
"209 N. C. 772, 184 S.E. 836 (1936).
"178 N. C. 683, 100 S. E. 241 (1919).
"178 N. C 679, 100 S.E. 239 (1919).
'Record on Appeal, pp. 57, 351, State v. Flowers, 211 N. C. 721, 192 S.E. 110
(193e7) note 9, supra.
"See note 10, supra.
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guilty knowledge. In State v. Stancil'16 D was tried for stealing tobacco,
and evidence that he had previously stolen tobacco in the same neighborhood was admitted to prove intent and design or plan. In State v.
SiMons' z D was indicted for having whiskey for sale in violation of
law. Evidence that about a month later D was caught working on a
new still was held admissible to show intent. In not one of the above
cases is the question of identity involved. In each of these cases there
was no question about D's having done the acts involved in both the
collateral offense and the offense charged, and the only question was
the intention or state of mind of the accused at the time of the crime
charged. This differs from the principal case in which the evidence
of the collateral crime was for the purpose of proving that D was connected or identified with the crime charged, and because of this difference, cases under the exceptions for intent and guilty knowledge do
not logically support cases involving the exception for identity.
In those North Carolina cases which have dealt with the admissibility of evidence of another distinct offense to prove identity there
has been a fairly obvious connection between the collateral crime and
the one charged which indicated strongly that if D were engaged in the
commission of the collateral crime he was also involved in the one
charged. This connection is illustrated in the following situations: (1)
In the trial of D for setting fire to an outhouse evidence that a dwelling
house fifteen feet away was fired at the same time, in the same manner,
and by faggots bound with D's rope, was held admissible.' 8 (2) In a
trial of D for breaking and entering a house and stealing therefrom,
evidence of the possession of the stolen goods soon after the robbery
was held admissible.' 9 (3) Evidence was admitted, in a trial of D's
for burning a barn, that their footprints led from the barn to the site
of a mill fire which occurred the same night, and with which the D's
were connected by other evidence. 20 (4) In a trial of D for secret
assault evidence was admitted that a short time prior to the offense
charged D had shot at the prosecuting witness' home, and had threatened to shoot the prosecuting witness. 21 (5) In a trial of D for murder, committed in the course of a robbery, evidence that D had previously ridden around often with those known to have been involved,
and had committed several robberies with them, was held competent. 22
In the principal case the connection between the collateral offense
and the one charged is not as strong, and the relevancy is questionable.
The two conspiracies are so fundamentally different that evidence of
1
"See note 11, supra.
See note 12, supra.
I State v. Thompson, 97 N. C 496, 1 S. E, 921 (1887).
"State v. Weaver, 104 N. C. 758, 10 S. E. 486 (1889) ; State v. Hullen, 133
N. C. 656, 45 S. E. 513 (1903).
' State v. Griffith, 185 N. C. 756, 117 S. E. 586 (1923).
-' State v. Miller, 189 N. C. 695, 128 S. E. 1 (1925).
' State v. Ferrell, 205 N. C. 640, 172 S. E. 186 (1933).
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complicity in one is extremely weak evidence of identity with the other.
The principal case, then, is apparently unsupported by the cases cited
by the court, and seems definitely out of line with prior decisions involving the use of testimony as to other offenses to prove identity.
JOSEPH M. KITTNER.
Declaratory Judgments-Insurance.
Plaintiff, insurer, issued life policies to defendant, the insured, providing for waiver of premiums and payment of benefits in the event of
the insured's becoming disabled. Having refused to allow repeated
claims for disability benefits, the insurer sought declaratory relief in a
federal court to the effect that the insured was not disabled and that
the policies were void for non-payment of premiums. Held, by the
Supreme Court, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act1 is constitutional, and a controversy was presented in which the insurer was en2
titled to declaratory relief.
In spite of three adverse Supreme Court dicta,3 it has been assumed
generally that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, if invoked in an
actual controversy, 4 is valid. This assumption has found support in
numerous decisions of state courts sustaining, similar legislation, 5 in the
Supreme Court's apparent change of attitude in Nashville, Chattanooga,
and St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace,6 and in favorable decisions in the lower
federal courts.7 The principal case is, however, the first square holding by the Supreme Court that the Federal Act is constitutional. The
decision is equally significant as an indication of the increasing utility
of the declaratory judgment in insurance cases. 8
148 STAT. 955 (1934) as amended 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. A. §400
(Supp. 1936).

Compare with North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act, N. C.
1935) §628.
'Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S.227, 57 Sup. Ct. 461, 81 L. ed.
Adv. Ops. 394 (1937).
'Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282, 71 L. ed.
541 (1927); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co6perative
Marketing Ass'n, 276 U. S.71, 88, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 294, 72 L. ed. 473, 479 (1928) ;
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct. 507, 509,
72 L. ed. 880, 884 (1928). Cases criticized, Borchard, The Supreme Court and
the DeclaratoryJudgment (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 633, 635.
' U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §2; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup.
Ct. 250, 55 L. ed. 246 (1911). The Federal Act, cited supra note 1, limits the
power to grant declaratory judgments to "cases of actual controversy."
'State v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921); Board of Education v.
Van Zandt, 119 Misc. 124, 195 N. Y. Supp. 297 (1922) ; Carolina Power and Light
Co. v. Iseley, 203 N. C. 811, 167 S.E. 56 (1933); Petition of Kariher, 284 Pa.
455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
8288 U. S.249, 264, 53 Sup.Ct. 345, 348, 77 L. ed. 730, 736 (1933) (declaratory
judgment under Tennessee Statute held to be entitled to review in the Supreme
Court).I
'Commercal Casualty Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Tex. 1935);
Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
8 For a more extended treatment of the declaratory judgment and the insurance
contract see: Morrison, Availability of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for
Life Insurance Cases (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 788; comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J.
286.
CODE ANN. (Michie,

